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Smooth sailing for Australia's automatic forfeiture of foreign fishing vessels 
Abstract 
The High Court of Australia has brought to a close one chapter of the various legal proceedings arising 
out of Australia’s arrest of the Russian fishing vessel Volga in 2002. The vessel was arrested on the high 
seas immediately adjacent to Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surrounding the Heard and 
McDonald Islands in the Southern Ocean. It was suspected (and later found as a matter of fact) to have 
been engaged in unlawful fishing for the prized Patagonian Toothfish within Australia’s EEZ two to three 
weeks prior to its detection and seizure by Australian authorities. The circumstances of the seizure and 
detention of the vessel and its senior crew led to a number of domestic legal proceedings in the Western 
Australian District and Supreme Courts and the Federal Court of Australia. There was also a largely 
successful application by Russia to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for the 
prompt release of the vessel. ITLOS ordered Australia to promptly release the vessel upon the posting of 
what it considered to be a reasonable bond or other security of A$1.92 million. The ITLOS case concerned 
only the issue of the reasonableness of the conditions Australia set for the release of the vessel as 
required by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). 
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Editorial commentary 
SMOOTH SAILING FOR AUSTRALIA’S AUTOMATIC FORFEITURE OF 
FOREIGN FISHING VESSELS 
The High Court of Australia has brought to a close one chapter of the various legal proceedings 
arising out of Australia’s arrest of the Russian fishing vessel Volga in 2002. The vessel was arrested 
on the high seas immediately adjacent to Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surrounding 
the Heard and McDonald Islands in the Southern Ocean. It was suspected (and later found as a matter 
of fact 1 ) to have been engaged in unlawful fishing for the prized Patagonian Toothfish within 
Australia’s EEZ two to three weeks prior to its detection and seizure by Australian authorities. The 
circumstances of the seizure and detention of the vessel and its senior crew led to a number of 
domestic legal proceedings in the Western Australian District2 and Supreme Courts3 and the Federal 
Court of Australia.4 There was also a largely successful application by Russia to the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for the prompt release of the vessel. ITLOS ordered 
Australia to promptly release the vessel upon the posting of what it considered to be a reasonable 
bond or other security of A$1.92 million. 5  The ITLOS case concerned only the issue of the 
reasonableness of the conditions Australia set for the release of the vessel as required by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).6  
 The issue brought to the attention of the High Court in the present case on 22 April 2005 was an 
application by Olbers Co Ltd, the Russian former owners of the Volga , for special leave to appeal 
from the decision of the Full Federal Court of Australia 7 affirming an earlier decision of a single 
judge of the Federal Court 8 dismissing an application by Olbers for a declaration that Australia’s 
seizure and detention of the vessel was illegal. Olbers sought damages for what it alleged was an 
unlawful seizure and expropriation of the vessel and its catch. The High Court dismissed the 
application.9 
 The refusal to grant special leave to appeal means the decision of the Full Federal Court holding 
that Australia’s remarkable s 106A automatic forfeiture provision in the Fisheries Management Act 
1991 (Cth) operates to transfer legal ownership of a vessel at the time of illegal fishing, and not later 
upon proof of the offence in court, now has the imprimatur of the High Court of Australia. In the Full 
Federal Court Olbers had levelled an array of challenges to Australia’s seizure and detention of the 
vessel. It is submitted that while the High Court’s decision to refuse special leave is sound in terms of 
the weakness of the appellant’s challenges to the arrest under Australian law, it nevertheless confirms 
the existence of a glaring inconsistency between Australia’s domestic fisheries law and Australia’s 
international obligations under LOSC. The nature of this inconsistency, the facts of the case and the 
first Federal Court decision of French J of 12 March 2004 are reviewed in an earlier piece in this 
journal that preceded the Full Federal Court decision of 16 September 2004.10 The inconsistency 
relates to the apparent effect of s 106A to deny the flag state of a foreign vessel seized by Australia 
 
1 Olbers v Commonwealth (No 4) (2004) 136 FCR 67; 205 ALR 432 at 449; [2004] FCA 229. 
2 R v Lijo [2004] WADC 29. 
3 Lijo v the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2003] WASCA 4. 
4 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325; [2004] FCAFC 262, Olbers v Commonwealth 
(No 4) (2004) 136 FCR 67; 205 ALR 432; [2004] FCA 229, Olbers v Commonwealth (No 3) [2003] FCA 651, Olbers Co Ltd v 
Commonwealth (No 2) [2003] FCA 177, Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth [2002] FCA 1269. 
5 Russian Federation v Australia) (Prompt Release) (Judgment) (2002) ITLOS Case No 11 (the Volga Case). See Gullett W, 
“Prompt Release Procedures and the Challenge for Fisheries Law Enforcement: The Judgment of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea in the Volga Case (Russian Federation v Australia)” (2003) 31 FL Rev 395. 
6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea , opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3; ATS 1994 No 31; 
ILM 21 p 1261 (entered into force for Australia and generally 16 November 1994), Art 73. 
7 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325; [2004] FCAFC 262. 
8 Olbers v Commonwealth (No 4) (2004) 136 FCR 67; 205 ALR 432; [2004] FCA 229. 
9 Olbers v Commonwealth [2005] HCA Trans 228 (per Hayne and Callinan JJ). 
10 Gullett W, “Developments in Australian Fisheries Law: Setting the Law of the Sea Convention Adrift?” (2004) 21 EPLJ 169 
at 173-176. See also Baird R, “Coastal State Fisheries Management: A Review of Australian Enforcement Action in the Heard 
and McDonald Islands Australian Fishing Zone” (2004) 9 Deakin LR 91 and Baird R, “Testing the Waters: Fine Tuning the 
Provisions of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) applicable to foreign fishing boats” (2004) 32 UWALR 63. 
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the opportunity to make use of appeal mechanisms in LOSC to ITLOS on the basis that there is  no 
international dispute because Australia would simply have seized its own vessel. The challenges 
presented by Olbers to the Full Federal Court concerned the relevance to s 106A of the condemnation 
provisions of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), the lawfulness of Australia’s “hot pursuit” 
(both in terms of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) and LOSC), and a number of 
constitutional arguments.  
Condemnation provisions 
Olbers argued that the words in s 106A should not be ascribed their plain and ordinary meaning 
because they are qualified by the condemnation provisions which follow in ss 106B-106G. These 
sections allow for the institution of proceedings against the Commonwealth by a dispossessed owner 
seeking a declaration that the item has not been forfeited on the basis that a relevant offence had not 
occurred. If such proceedings are unsuccessful, the item will then be “condemned as forfeited”.11 The 
submission by Olbers was that forfeiture under s 106A is not legally effective until the steps specified 
in the condemnation provisions have been taken. This would mean that, at the time of the actual 
seizure of the Volga, legal title would not have passed from Olbers to Australia. It could only pass 
quite some time later after there had been a condemnation determination. If this argument were to be 
accepted, then the only manner in which Australia could have lawfully arrested the vessel on the high 
seas would be if it had done so in accordance with ss 84 (seizure power) and 87 (power to pursue 
outside Australian waters). Such an arrest must be done in a manner consistent with a lawful hot 
pursuit, as set out in s 87. Yet, as noted below, Olbers submitted that there had not been a lawful hot 
pursuit. 
 The Full Federal Court determined that the condemnation provision does not affect the forfeiture 
because it is merely a means to adjudge later a forfeiture that has already taken place, in order to 
ensure that the forfeiture is officially recognised and recorded. The condemnation provision would 
only assis t in circumstances where the Commonwealth was unable to satisfy the court that the vessel 
had been involved in a relevant offence.12 But here, the offence had been established on the facts. 
Lawfulness of hot pursuit 
Notwithstanding the failure of the condemnation submission, the Full Federal Court commented on 
the linked submission that the pursuit undertaken by Australia was not lawful. The circumstances 
leading up to and including the arrest of the vessel, as found by the primary judge, was that 
Australia’s naval vessel had changed its course for the purpose of intercepting the Volga and had sent 
off its helicopter while the Volga was within Australia’s EEZ, although no contact was made with the 
vessel until it had reached the high seas.13 Olbers pointed out that a requirement of LOSC14 was that a 
hot pursuit cannot commence until a vessel has been ordered to stop, and that this must take place 
while the vessel is within the coastal state’s jurisdiction. As this had not occurred, Olbers submitted 
that Australia’s subsequent arrest of the vessel on the high seas was unlawful. 
 The Full Court examined the s 87 hot pursuit provision and noted from its Second Reading 
Speech that it was intended to reflect the hot pursuit provisions of LOSC. However, the actual words 
used in the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) are quite different from Art 111 of LOSC. One 
point of disparity is s 87(a). This provides that a foreign vessel may be seized if “one or more 
officers … have pursued the … boat from a place within the AFZ” (Australian Fishing Zone – a zone 
under domestic law which overlaps the entire EEZ and extends to a maximum of 200 nautical miles 
from the baseline) to a place outside (including the high seas). Without needing to decide the matter, 
the Full Court noted15  the finding of Blaxell DCJ in the Western Australian District Court in a 
separate litigation,16 that the pursuit had commenced before the Volga had left the AFZ and opined 
 
11 Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth), s 106G(3) 
12 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325 at 331. 
13 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325 at 332. 
14 LOSC, Art 111(4). 
15 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325 at 332. 
16 R v Lijo [2004] WADC 29. 
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that “[t]he District Court judge’s reasons for that conclusion seem compelling”.17 Their Honours did 
not express a concluded view on whether s 87 simply reflected LOSC provisions, but it is clear that 
the Full Court did not consider that s  87 should be read as being confined to the LOSC provisions. In 
one of the earlier cases in the Federal Court, French J had also stated that the interpretation of s 87 
“must have regard to the practical exigencies of the circumstances in which pursuit might have to be 
undertaken”.18 
 The effect of these pronouncements from the Federal Court, although strictly obiter, leave the 
position that a hot pursuit of a foreign vessel may be lawful under Australian law in circumstances 
where it patently is unlawful under international law, as expressed in LOSC. This relates most 
obviously to the circumstances in which a pursuit is taken to have commenced, the need for a “stop” 
order to be issued, and potentially with respect to whether contact has been lost in the course of the 
pursuit.19 It is to be remembered that Australia’s prescriptive jurisdiction in its EEZ is sourced from 
LOSC itself. Further, although LOSC envisages that coastal state parties enact laws for their maritime 
zones, these are circumscribed to the extent that they must be consistent with the Convention.20 There 
are also some specific restrictions on what laws coastal states can enact.21 
Constitutional arguments 
The Full Court also dismissed a number of constitutional arguments respecting the manner in which 
the vessel was forfeited. Initially, before French J, Olbers had submitted that the forfeiture offended 
the constitutional guarantee that the acquisition of property is on just terms.22 French J rejected this 
argument on the basis that Australia had not “acquired” the vessel; rather, the vessel had been 
forfeited to Australia by way of penalty for an unlawful activity.23 This point was not relitigated 
before the Full Court.  
 Olbers nevertheless raised new constitutional arguments before the Full Court. First, it submitted 
that the forfeiture amounted to an unlawful conferral of judicial power on the Executive. This 
submission was rejected on the basis that forfeiture is by operation of law and as such was not an 
exercise of judicial power.24  
 Second, it was submitted that there was no head of power to support s 106A. The Full Court 
considered that sufficient power existed25 in the fisheries power26 and potentially also the external 
affairs power27 or the trade and commerce power.28 
 The final constitutional argument was that the automatic forfeiture provision was too broad and 
was not “reasonably proportionate and adapted” to the fisheries power. The Full Court considered 
otherwise and remarked that the forfeiture provision was an appropriate legislative response to the 
protection of a limited public resource and only occurred upon the existence of a specified offence.29 
Significantly, it stated: 
 
17 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325 at 332. 
18 Olbers v Commonwealth (No 4) (2004) 136 FCR 67; 205 ALR 432 at 457; [2004] FCA 229. 
19 With respect to this last point, the declaration in s 87(2) and 87(3) that a pursuit is not taken to be terminated or substantially 
interrupted only because officers onboard the pursuit vessel have lost sight of the vessel they are pursuing, or have lost output 
from a radar or other sensing device, is a qualification not found in LOSC. Likewise, the statement in Art 111(4) of the LOSC 
that a pursuit can only commence “after a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which enables it to be 
seen or heard” has not been included in the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth). 
20 LOSC, Art 62(4). 
21 Of note, coastal states may not provide penalties of imprisonment or corporal punishment for violations of fisheries laws by 
foreigners: LOSC, Art 73(3). 
22 Commonwealth Constitution, s 51(xxxi). 
23 Olbers v Commonwealth (No 4) (2004) 136 FCR 67; 205 ALR 432 at 456; [2004] FCA 229. 
24 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325 at 335. 
25 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325 at 334. 
26 Commonwealth Constitution, s 51(x). 
27 Commonwealth Constitution, s 51(xxix). 
28 Commonwealth Constitution, s 51(i). 
29 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325 at 335. 
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This is so even if the relevant legislative regime were in breach of some norm of international law 
(although we have not reached any view that any such breach occurred in this case).30  
Decision of the Full Court 
The Full Court upheld French J’s decision and concluded: 
The Volga was forfeited to the Commonwealth upon the commission of the offence. The vessel, the 
relevant equipment and the catch were the property of the Commonwealth at the time that the vessel 
was boarded by military personnel. Those personnel were acting as agents for the owners of the vessel 
at the time that the vessel was boarded and taken into their custody.31 
Comment 
The decision of the Full Federal Court shows that a clear line is to be drawn between the seizure of a 
foreign vessel on the high seas pursuant to the hot pursuit provision of the Fisheries Management 
Act 1991 (Cth) (which, as noted above, differs from international law), and a seizure of a formerly-
foreign vessel on the high seas pursuant to s 106A. Under ss 84 and 87 of the Fisheries Management 
Act 1991 (Cth), Australia can lawfully arrest a foreign vessel on the high seas if it reasonably believes 
that the vessel had previously engaged in unlawful fishing within Australia’s maritime jurisdiction 
and Australia had continuously pursued it from within its EEZ to the high seas. But the circumstances 
in which Australia can lawfully arrest a vessel on the high seas pursuant to s 106A is far more wide 
ranging. With regard to a foreign vessel which had committed an offence within Australian waters, 
that vessel can now (under Australian law) be seized “anywhere on the globe”,32 including on the 
high seas, without a need for there to be a hot pursuit. This is because Australia would simply be 
effecting a seizure of an Australian vessel (acting as its own agent), and the former foreign owners of 
the vessel would have been dispossessed of their title to it at the time of the commission of the acts 
constituting a relevant offence. Such a construction of Australian law – specifically declared by the 
Full Federal Court and not disavowed by the High Court – runs contrary to numerous rights granted 
to flag states under LOSC as well as the underlying rationale of the Convention, which sought to 
balance the interests of coastal and flag states.  
 Section 106A operates as a way for Australia, among other things (if it so wishes), to circumvent 
the entire hot pursuit provisions in LOSC and the rights of the flag state of a dispossessed owner to 
seek compensation for an alleged breach by Australia of its international obligations (such as using 
undue force when effecting an arrest or arresting a vessel without there being a lawful hot pursuit). It 
also renders redundant the pursuit provision in the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) itself, at 
least with respect to arrests of (formerly) foreign vessels on the high seas where there has, in fact, 
been a relevant breach of Australian fisheries law. In these circumstances, Australia is simply seizing 
its own vessel.33 It is unimaginable that ITLOS, if called upon to decide the matter, would consider 
the operation of s  106A as being properly within the limits imposed directly or indirectly by LOSC. 
 The remarkable aspect of s 106A is not so much that it operates to transfer legal title before proof 
of an offence in court, but that title to a foreign vessel passes to Australia before it is seized, and even 
before Australia has detected the commission of the offence. This can occur any length of time before 
Australia effects a seizure or is even aware that an offence has, or may have, been committed. 
 Such discrepancy between Australian fisheries law and international obligations cannot be 
satisfactorily defended on the basis that Australia is a world leader in combating the problems of 
large-scale illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. If Russia were to return to ITLOS to challenge 
the lawfulness of the manner in which the vessel was arrested (an issue that was not specifically 
litigated in the prompt release application), Australia would be forced to assert at ITLOS that Russia 
 
30 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325 at 335. 
31 Olbers Co Ltd v Commonwealth (2004) 148 A Crim R 547; 212 ALR 325 at 334. 
32 Ian MacDonald (Minister for Fisheries), “New Chapter in Maritime Law: Attempt to Claim Back the Volga rejected” (Press 
release, 13 March 2004). 
33 Note that s 87 limits the operation of s 84 seizure powers, including s 84(ga) automatic forfeit ure seizures, for seizures 
outside the AFZ to where there has been a pursuit consistent with s 87. However, this would be of no avail to a dispossessed 
owner because at the time of the seizure they would not have been the owner of the vessel and therefore could not challenge the 
manner it which in was seized. 
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had no right to bring an action because, prior to its seizure, the vessel had, by operation of Australian 
law, become an Australian vessel. The scepticism with which such a submission would be viewed 
would undermine the otherwise leading role Australia has taken in the fight against illegal, unreported 
and unregulated fishing.  
Dr Warwick Gullett 
Centre for Maritime Policy 
Faculty of Law 
University of Wollongong 
